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Abstract. Many subsidiaries can deduct interest payments on internal debt from 
their taxable income.  By issuing internal debt from a tax haven, multinationals 
can shift income out of host countries through the interest rates they charge and 
the amount of internal debt they issue.  We show that, from a welfare perspective, 
thin-capitalization rules that restrict the amount of debt for which interest is tax 
deductible (safe harbor rules) are inferior to rules that limit the ratio of debt 
interest to pre-tax earnings (earnings stripping rules), even if a safe harbor rule is 
used in conjunction with an earnings stripping rule.    
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1. Introduction. 
 Earnings stripping is a tactic multinational firms use to shift taxable 
income from a high-tax country to a low-tax country by financing a subsidiary 
located in a high-tax country with loans from the parent (internal debt) through a 
subsidiary located in a low-tax country.  Since interest payments on debt are 
generally tax deductible, the use of internal debt allows multinationals to reduce 
its overall corporate income tax payments. 
 In 2014, earnings stripping was at the heart of the contentious debate 
about corporate inversions.  By moving the parent corporation of a multinational 
from the United States to a country with a lower tax rate (pretty much the rest of 
the world), the new parent corporation could load up its U.S. subsidiaries with 
internal debt in order to strip pre-tax income out of the United States.  This 
concern prompted legislators such as Senator Charles Schumer to propose 
legislation specifically intended to curb earnings stripping activity. 2   
 Earnings stripping is also central to the on-going criticisms by a number of 
OECD countries of the U.S. "Check-The-Box" (CTB) legislation.  CTB was 
passed in 1997 to simplify the process by which a U.S. firm could elect its tax 
status as a corporation or a partnership.  For U.S. multinationals, CTB enables the 
parent company to structure an affiliate in a host country so that it is treated as a 
corporation/subsidiary by the host country and as a branch by the United States.  
The effect of CTB is that the U.S. parent can use internal debt to strip taxable 
income out of a host country without generating an offsetting tax liability in the 
United States (as subpart F income).3    
                                                 
2 See McKinnon (2014). 
3 Blouin and Krull (2015) provide a more detailed description of the tax 
implications of CTB. 
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 The amount of interest that a subsidiary of a multinational can deduct from 
its host country taxable income is determined by the rate of interest applied to its 
debt and the amount of its debt.  Host countries can limit tax-induced income 
shifting via manipulation of the interest rate on internal debt (a transfer price) by 
auditing to make sure that the interest rate is in line with what a third-party lender 
would charge for a comparable risk (i.e., the arm's-length standard).  Host 
countries can also limit the use of income shifting via the amount of debt 
financing by adopting thin-capitalization rules.  
 Most countries do not have thin-capitalization rules to inhibit the amount 
of internal debt financing.  Instead, they tend to rely on the arm’s-length principle 
to determine what an independent lender would have been willing to lend to the 
firm.  Among countries that have thin-capitalization rules, most use a type of rule 
called a safe harbor rule.  A safe harbor rule limits the tax deductibility of interest 
payments if the debt-equity ratio of the subsidiary is too large.4  A smaller number 
of countries use what is called an earnings stripping rule, which limits the tax 
deductibility of interest payments if the operating subsidiary's interest payments 
exceed a specified percentage of the subsidiary's pre-tax earnings normally 
defined as the subsidiary's EBITDA.5  The use of earnings stripping rules has 
emerged in recent years because of the perception that safe harbor rules are 
ineffective.  A few countries use both types of rules, whereby a subsidiary must 
satisfy either both rules or only one of the rules.  Table 1 reports the variation in 
thin-capitalization rules among 160 countries in 2013.6   
 
 
                                                 
4 See Blouin et al. (2014) and Table 1.  
5 EBITDA stands for earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization.  
6 The data comes primarily from Ernst and Young (2013). 
4 
 
Table 1: Number of countries with each type of thin-capitalization rule in 
2013 (sample size = 160) 
None or 
Arm's-
Length 
Regulation 
Safe 
Harbor 
Earnings 
Stripping 
Safe 
Harbor and 
Earnings 
Stripping 
Safe 
Harbor or 
Earnings 
Stripping 
Special 
Rules 
100 45 4 2 6 3 
 
 Notable countries that use the arm’s length standard without a thin-
capitalization rule include Austria, Finland, Ireland, India, the Netherlands, and 
Norway.7  Although the number of countries using an earnings stripping rule, 
alone or in conjunction with a safe harbor rule is small, they include significant 
economics.  The countries using only an earnings stripping rule in 2013 are 
Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.  Denmark and Japan impose both a safe 
harbor rule and an earnings stripping rule.  Bulgaria, France, Guam, Northern 
Marinana Islands, the United States, and the U.S. Virgin Islands impose an 
earnings stripping rule and a safe harbor rule but require that only one be 
satisfied.  For France, a company need only satisfy one of the rules.  For Bulgaria, 
the United States, and its affiliated territories, the earnings stripping rule is 
marginal in that it is effective only if the safe harbor limit is exceeded.  Hong 
Kong, Sweden, and the United Kingdom do not have thin-capitalization rules but 
use other special rules to limit debt financing.  
 In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium framework with both labor 
and capital that allows us to analyze the implications of the various thin-
capitalization rules observed in practice.  The model allows us to understand how 
a country's choice of a thin-capitalization rule influences not just the incidence of 
internal debt financing but also the transfer pricing behavior of multinationals.  In 
our setting, a host country chooses a thin-capitalization rule to limit income 
                                                 
7 Finland and Norway adopted earnings stripping rules in 2014. 
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shifting by excessive interest deductions.  A multinational firm has a financing 
subsidiary located in a tax haven and can invest in an operational subsidiary in the 
host country (high-tax country).  The operational affiliate can shift pre-tax income 
to the tax-haven affiliate by the level of internal debt borrowed from the haven 
affiliate and the interest rate (transfer price) it pays on this internal debt.   
 We show the policy, among all the combinations observed in practice, 
which maximizes the host country’s national income is an earnings stripping rule 
without a safe harbor rule. The reason for our result is as follows. The 
multinational firm can shift profit either by the abusive interest rate (transfer 
price) or by internal debt. The latter allows the firm to avoid the tax on the normal 
rate of return on mobile capital directly, whereas an abusive transfer price is an 
indirect and more costly way of mitigating the tax wedge both for the firm and 
society.  An earnings stripping rule is more effective at curbing abusive transfer 
pricing and is therefore a better choice from a host country’s perspective.  
 
1.1 Related literature. 
 It is well known that multinational companies shift income by debt and 
transfer prices from affiliates in low-tax countries to affiliates in high-tax 
countries.  In general, the income-shifting tactics of multinationals can have two 
effects.  The first effect is base erosion.  The significance of this effect is 
evidenced by the BEPS project initiated by the OECD in 2013 (OECD, 2013).  
The second effect of profit shifting is increased foreign direct investment (FDI) 
from a higher after-tax return to investment.   
 There is a small but emerging literature that discusses the welfare effects 
of tax havens when multinationals use tax-haven conduit companies to shift 
income.  Hines (2010) argues that although the tax avoidance opportunities 
presented by tax havens may reduce revenues in high-tax jurisdictions, they may 
have offsetting effects on FDI that are attractive to the same governments.  If 
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governments cannot distinguish between mobile and immobile investments, tax 
havens permit governments to subject immobile investments to higher taxes than 
mobile investments.  Hong and Smart (2010) demonstrate this effect in a model 
where multinationals shift income by debt from a tax-haven affiliate.  They show 
that providing a tax deduction for interest payments on subsidiary debt allows 
host countries to maintain or even increase high business tax rates, and to attract 
more mobile investments from multinationals because the tax deductibility of 
interest reduces the firm’s after-tax cost of capital.  The result is higher host 
welfare.  
 Gresik et al. (2015) (hereafter GSS) model a host country that chooses a 
corporate income tax rate and a safe harbor rule and multinationals choose capital, 
labor, and internal debt levels and the transfer price of debt.  They show that the 
positive investment effect in Hong and Smart (2010) is more likely to dominate in 
host countries with developed economies and that the negative tax base erosion 
effect is more likely to dominate in developing economies.  The reason is that 
developed countries have better institutions that curb transfer pricing more 
effectively.  Slemrod and Wilson (2009) use the standard tax competition model 
but add “parasitic” tax havens to the model in the sense that tax havens are 
“parasitic” on the tax revenues of non-haven countries.  In their model tax havens 
sell concealment services to taxpayers in non-havens, and non-haven countries 
must expend real resources to prevent tax base erosion.  They show that tax 
havens increase the social costs that a country incurs when it increases its tax on 
capital.  This aggravates the tax competition problem and results in lower welfare.  
 There is also a positive literature on the tax sensitivity of debt and the 
effect of thin-capitalization rules on a firm’s financial structure.  Huizinga et al. 
(2008) model the optimal allocation of external debt and find that ignoring 
international debt shifting as part of the firm's leverage decision understates the 
impact of national taxes on debt policies by about 25%.  Egger et al. (2010) 
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analyze debt shifting by internal debt and find that multinationals have a 
significantly higher debt-to-asset ratio than national firms, and that this difference 
is larger in high-tax countries.  Møen et al. (2015) show that it is optimal for a 
multinational firm to shift profit by using both internal debt and external debt.  A 
main result from their empirical analysis is that the shifting of internal and 
external debt is of about equal importance in German multinationals. 8    
 The empirical literature on the effect of different types of thin-
capitalization rules on the firm’s financial structure concludes that thin-
capitalization rules have a substantial effect on both internal and external 
leverage.  Büttner et al. (2012) study foreign affiliates of German multinationals 
and find that thin-capitalization rules effectively reduce the incentive to use 
internal loans for tax planning but result in higher external debt. 9  Blouin et al. 
(2014) investigate how thin-capitalization rules worldwide affect the capital 
structure of foreign affiliates of US multinational firms.  They find that 
restrictions on an affiliate’s debt-to-asset ratio reduce this ratio on average by 
1.9%, while restrictions on an affiliate’s borrowing from the parent debt-to-equity 
ratio reduce this ratio by 6.3%.  Both studies thus find evidence that thin-
capitalization rules have a substantial effect on the capital structure within 
multinational firms. 
 Two other papers analyze rules that restrict leverage ratios in a theoretical 
framework.  Haufler and Runkel (2012) use a tax competition model to show that 
if countries set tax rates and safe harbor rules, smaller countries have an incentive 
                                                 
8 See also Desai (2004) for U.S. multinationals and Mintz and Weichenrieder 
(2010) for an overview. The empirical literature on taxation and capital structure, 
as reviewed in Auerbach (2002) and Graham (2003), find small effects of tax 
incentives on capital structure. This is attributed to a lack of variation in tax rates. 
More recent studies where data encompass the bulk of tax reforms in OECD 
countries find larger effects. 
9 See also Wamser (2008) and Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008). 
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to set more permissive safe harbor rules because they face a more elastic tax base.  
More closely related to our paper is Mardan (2015) who investigates earnings 
stripping rules and rules in a setting with two countries and capital as the only 
input.  His focus is on how credit market constraints may affect leverage and thin-
capitalization rules.  He finds no clear cut preference for safe harbor or earnings 
stripping rules.10   
To our knowledge we are the first to show in a general equilibrium 
framework with both capital and labor as input choices, with firms engaging in 
both transfer pricing and debt shifting, and that allows for hybrid as well as 
traditional rules, that an earnings stripping rules maximizes a host country’s 
national income. 
 The rest of our paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents a model 
in which multinational firms can shift profit with debt financing and transfer 
prices.  To allow for the hybrid policies observed in Bulgaria, Denmark, France, 
Japan, and the United States, a host country will choose a thin-capitalization 
policy that consists of both a safe harbor limit and an earnings stripping limit.  
Section 3 derives the optimal firm responses to all possible host country's thin 
capitalization policies.  Section 4 then describes which limits will be binding in 
any FDI and labor-market equilibrium.  The host country's optimal thin 
capitalization policy is then derived in section 5.  Several extensions of the base 
model are discussed in section 6 and concluding remarks are offered in section 7. 
 
2.  A model of profit-shifting via debt and transfer prices.   
 We adapt the model in GSS to allow for a host country to distinguish 
                                                 
10 Kalamov (2015) studies the equilibrium choice of safe harbor and earnings 
stripping rules with two host countries but in a model in which the multinational 
cannot shift income into a tax haven with transfer pricing.  
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between the effects of a safe harbor rule and an earnings stripping rule.   A 
multinational firm can invest capital, either equity or debt, in a single host 
country.  All of the FDI is issued by a subsidiary of the multinational located in a 
tax-haven country that levies a zero tax rate on corporate income.   
 The host country economy consists of workers, who inelastically supply 
one unit of labor, and entrepreneurs, who own domestic firms.  Domestic firms 
can employ Ld units of labor at a wage rate w to produce ( )dG L units of output 
that are sold in a competitive market.  The output price is normalized to one.  The 
production function, ( )G  , is strictly increasing and strictly concave in dL .  The 
pre-tax profit of a domestic firm is  
 
   ( )d dG L wL   .      (2.1) 
 
The host country levies a profit tax rate of t so that domestic firms have a post-tax 
profit of (1 – t)π. 
 The multinational firm operates with the production function, ( , )mF L K , 
where Lm denotes the amount of host-country labor it employs and K denotes the 
amount of capital invested in its host country subsidiary.  ( , )F    is strictly 
increasing, strictly concave, and homogeneous of degree 1 in both inputs.  The 
multinational faces the same competitive wage rate, w, and sells its output in a 
competitive market whose price is also normalized to one.  Denote the 
multinational's economic cost of capital by r.   
 The multinational can choose to finance its capital investment with equity, 
E, and/or internal debt, B, so that K E B  .  In order to focus on the income-
shifting strategies of the multinational firm we focus on the use of internal debt 
only. By definition, income shifting is done between related parties and the vast 
majority of thin-capitalization rules in place targets intra-firm transactions and 
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internal debt only.11 
 We assume that the multinational's economic cost of capital reflects, in 
part, a country-specific risk of the investment so that r need not simply equal a 
worldwide interest rate.  The idiosyncratic cost of capital allows the multinational 
to charge its host country subsidiary an interest rate, , that can differ from r.  
That is,  is the transfer price of internal debt.  Allowing the multinational to use 
its transfer price on debt to shift income out of the host country is the simplest and 
most direct way to see the linkages between debt-shifting and transfer pricing, and 
it is consistent with the fact that many countries use arm's-length price auditing 
standards to the interest rates multinationals charge for internal debt. 
 The multinational incurs transfer pricing costs of ( )c r B  to reflect any 
transfer price auditing the host country may conduct.  These transfer pricing costs 
consist of two components.  First, the cost function, ( )c  , is increasing and convex 
in the difference between and r, which we take to be the arm's-length interest 
rate.12  Second, the multinational's transfer pricing costs are proportional to the 
amount of debt as the total amount of shifted profit will equal ( )r B  . 
 A key reason for financing a subsidiary with debt instead of equity is that 
payments on debt are tax deductible expenses while dividend payments to equity 
holders are not.13  In terms of the trade-offs between issuing external debt and 
                                                 
11 The main exceptions are Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Spain and Portugal. 
Norway and Finland, which recently introduced earnings stripping rules, do not 
restrict external debt.  
12 For example, U.K. thin-capitalization laws focus primarily on the transfer 
pricing issue in that the revenue authority "may challenge interest deductions on 
the grounds that, based on all of the circumstances, the loan would not have been 
made at all or that the amount loaned or the interest rate would have been less, if 
the lender was an unrelated third party acting at arm’s length" (Ernst & Young, 
2013, p. 1367). 
13Davies and Gresik (2003) study the role of debt borrowed from host country 
investors. 
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internal debt, previous studies such as Stonehill and Stitzel (1969) and Chowdhry 
and Coval (1998) argue that internal debt is really tax-favored equity.  However, 
Chowdry and Nanda (1994) show that internal debt can be issued with the same 
seniority as external debt.  As a result internal debt can create agency costs 
associated with an increased probability of bankruptcy. Internal debt also 
generates costs of complying with thin capitalization rules and adjusting 
managerial incentive contracts.  Consistent with Egger et al. (2010), Mintz and 
Smart (2004), Schindler and Schjelderup (2012) and Mardan (2015), we assume 
the multinational incurs debt-financing costs of D(B/K) that are strictly increasing 
and strictly convex in the subsidiary's debt to equity ratio for B > 0.  We also 
assume that (i) (0) 0D  , (ii) (0) 0D  , and (iii) (1)D   .   
 As long as the subsidiary faces the same tax rate on host country profit as 
do domestic firms, the multinational's after-tax profit is defined as  
 
     (1 )( ( , ) ) ( ) ( / )m mt F L K wL B B rK c r B D B K            .  (2.2) 
 
Notice that the subsidiary's interest expense, B , is tax deductible in the host 
country. According to (2.2), the multinational can avoid any transfer price costs 
by setting r  even if B > 0 while it can avoid the debt issuance costs only by 
setting B = 0.  The tax savings from internal debt net of transfer price costs equals
( )t c B  , which implies that the unconstrained optimal transfer price satisfies
c t  .  By the convexity of ( )c  , t c   for all  such that c t  .  For any 
positive values of K and Lm, 
 
  ( ) ( / ) ( ) 0d B t c d t c D K dB t c dB              
 
for B = 0 and c t  .  Thus, in the absence of any thin-capitalization rules, a 
12 
 
multinational that chooses to invest in the host country has an incentive to use 
some debt financing. 
 If the host country adopts a safe harbor rule, then the host subsidiary will 
be able to deduct its interest expense against its host country income only if  
 
   sB b K        (2.3) 
 
where 0 1sb  .  If the host country adopts an earnings stripping rule, then the 
host subsidiary will be able to deduct its interest expense against its host country 
income only if  
 
   ( )e mB b F wL         (2.4) 
 
where 0 1eb  .  The term mF wL  represents the host subsidiary's EBITDA so 
an earnings stripping rule requires that its interest payments do not exceed a given 
percentage of its pre-tax earnings.   Setting bs = 1 is equivalent to imposing no 
safe harbor limit on internal debt while setting be = 1 is equivalent to letting the 
multinational strip out all of its pre-tax host country earnings through its internal 
debt financing.  Ineq. (2.4) need not bind for a profit-maximizing firm, even when 
its host subsidiary is financed entirely with debt.  For example, if the 
multinational employs labor so that LF w , then setting B = K in (2.4) requires
/K eF b .  With be  (1 t) and sufficiently costly transfer price regulation,
will be small enough so that (2.4) is slack. 
 The host country seeks to maximize its national income, Y, which is the 
sum of worker and entrepreneur consumption.  Aggregate worker consumption 
equals wage income, w, plus taxes, T.  Since a profit-maximizing multinational 
13 
 
will employ labor so that LF w , regardless of the thin-capitalization rule the host 
country adopts, host tax revenues equal  
 
  ( ) ( )m KT t t F wL B t t F K B          .   (2.5) 
 
Entrepreneur income equals (1 )t  .  Thus, host country national income is equal 
to  
 
  ( )KY w t F K B     .      (2.6) 
 
We do not include a welfare term that weights entrepreneur profit differently from 
worker income or tax revenues nor do we include a fraction of multinational 
profit associated with some host country ownership as these extra terms would not 
change our main result. 
 
3. Optimal Firm Behavior. 
 Allowing for the possibility that a host country imposes safe harbor and 
earnings stripping rules on the multinational, the firm's profit-maximization 
problem becomes 
 
 
, , ,
1
2
max (1 )( ) ( ) ( / )
. . (1)    ( , , , ) ( ) 0
(2)   ( , ) 0.
mK L B m
m e m
s
t F wL t B rK c r B D B K
s t g K L B B b F wL
g B K B b K
  
 
      
   
  
  (3.1) 
 
   To solve the multinational's profit-maximization problem, define the 
Lagrangean to be 
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(1 )( ) ( ) ( / )
( ( )) ( )
m
e m s
t F wL t B rK c r B D B K
B b F wL B b K
  
  
       
       (3.2) 
 
where  and are the Lagrange multipliers.  The necessary first-order conditions 
associated with (3.2) are 
  (a)    t  c D / K , 
  (b) ( ) 0B t c    ,      (3.3) 
  (c)  (1 )( ) 0e Lt b F w    , 
and 
  (d) 2( / ) / (1 )K s eF r BD K b t b      . 14 
    
 In the absence of either a safe harbor rule and/or an earnings stripping 
rule, the profit-maximizing transfer price and amount of debt satisfy t c  and 
/t c D K   .  These equations show that the optimal values equate the 
marginal tax savings with the marginal cost of transfer pricing and debt, 
respectively.  Denote the optimal unconstrained transfer price by * .  * is greater 
than r for all t > 0 and is independent of K, Lm, and B.  For any , define ˆ( )B   to 
be the solution to the second equation, which is equivalent to (3.3.a) when neither 
constraint binds.  Debt-financing cost function properties (ii) and (iii) imply for 
all *[ , ]r  that ˆ0 ( )B K  .  ˆ( )B   is strictly increasing on *[ , )r  . The 
optimal unconstrained amount of debt, given K, equals *ˆ( )B  . 
                                                 
14 Although Π is not globally concave, due to the non-convexity of ( )D  with 
respect to B and K, the constraint qualifications are satisfied at all points at which 
one or both of the constraints binds, except if B = 0.  Since zero internal debt was 
ruled out as a solution in section 2, (3.3) and the associated complementary 
slackness conditions will define a solution to (3.1). 
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 Now consider the multinational's profit-maximizing decisions when the 
host country only imposes a safe harbor rule (i.e., be = 1 and 0  ).  In this case, 
the multinational's profit-maximizing transfer price is defined from (3.3.b) by
( )t c r  . Thus, the adoption of a safe harbor rule does not affect the firm's 
optimal transfer price as it is still * .  It corresponds to the optimal transfer price 
under a safe harbor rule in GSS.  The safe harbor constraint will bind, at * , only 
if *ˆ ( ) sB b K  .  
 Next consider the multinational's profit-maximizing decisions when the 
host country only imposes an earnings stripping rule (i.e., bs = 1 and 0  ).  If 
the earnings stripping constraint binds, then (3.3.b) implies that c t t     and 
hence that *   . Accordingly, introducing an earnings stripping rule gives the 
multinational the incentive to shift less income with its transfer price.  Since 
earnings stripping rules place a limit on B ,  the multinational can shift the same 
amount of income by substituting debt financing for transfer pricing.  In the 
extreme case in which there are no marginal costs associated with internal debt 
financing, the multinational will completely substitute away from income shifting 
through its transfer price and will set r  . 
 Figure 1 illustrates how both constraints interact for fixed (strictly 
positive) values of K and Lm.  The thick solid line identifies the values of and B 
for which the earnings stripping constraint is satisfied with equality, that is 1 0g  .  
The solid horizontal lines correspond to safe harbor constraints for three different 
policy parameters, high med lows s sb b b  . The vertical dot-dashed line helps locate * , 
the profit-maximizing transfer price under a safe harbor rule.  The curved dashed 
lines are isoprofit curves.  It is never optimal for a multinational to set *  or 
ˆ( )B B  .   
 Higher isoprofit curves correspond to higher profit.  The slope of the 
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•
• d 
•
g1=0 
  
r σ* 
K 
σ 
B 
a 
•
constraint curve, g1 = 0, equals /B   while the slope of an isoprofit curve 
equals ( ) / ( / )B t c t c D K     .  At *  , each isoprofit curve has a slope 
of zero while for all *[ , )r   the slope is negative, which means that a 
multinational will always choose a smaller transfer price under an earnings 
stripping rule than under a safe harbor rule.  And for all ˆ( )B B  , each isoprofit 
curve is strictly downward sloping and convex in  .  Point a corresponds to g1 = 
0 and r  .  When point a is below ˆ( )B r , the isoprofit curve through a is steeper 
than the earnings stripping curve (g1 = 0) because 0D  .  When point a is above 
ˆ( )B r , r  cannot be optimal because multinational profit is strictly increasing 
along ˆ( )B  .   This means a multinational still has an incentive to shift income 
with its transfer price by setting above r (unless 0D  ). 
 
 
                                  
 
 
    
         
 
 
            b 
 
              c 
 
 
  
 
 
    
 
 
This discussion implies the following proposition. 
Figure 1: Profit-maximizing transfer prices and debt levels. 
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Proposition 1. A profit-maximizing multinational operating under a binding 
earnings stripping rule will choose a transfer price strictly between r and * .     
 
 Recall from Table 1 that the United States uses an earnings stripping rule 
which applies only if the safe harbor rule is violated while France allows a firm to 
satisfy either its safe harbor rule or its earnings stripping rule.  Since the earnings 
stripping constraint is negatively sloped (as illustrated in Figure 1) either type of 
hybrid policy is weaker than a policy of simply requiring that both constraints be 
satisfied.  With a U.S. or French-type policy, the maximum debt level for which 
the interest payments would be tax deductible at each transfer price is the larger of 
the amounts allowed individually by each of the two rules.  But this means the 
optimal transfer price and debt level will be the same as if no earnings stripping 
rule was in force unless the earnings stripping limit permits higher debt levels 
than the safe harbor rule for all possible transfer prices.  In this case such hybrid 
policies are identical to imposing only an earnings stripping rule. 
 
Proposition 2. A U.S. or French hybrid policy is equivalent to a policy that uses 
only a safe harbor rule unless the earnings stripping limit permits higher internal 
debt levels for all transfer prices.  In this latter case, the hybrid policy is identical 
to one that uses only an earnings stripping rule.  
 
In order for a policy that uses both rules to generate different multinational 
behavior than a single rule would, the policy must require that both rules be 
satisfied (in which case the smaller limit on internal debt defines the maximum 
amount of debt that is permissible for each transfer price).  This is the policy 
Denmark and Japan use. 
 Figure 1 suggests three possible optimal transfer price-debt pairs: one at 
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which only the earnings stripping rule binds because bs is set very high (as at 
point b), one at which both constraints bind (as at point c), and one at which only 
the safe harbor rule binds (as at point d).  Figure 1 supports the intuition that if the 
safe harbor rule is weak enough (bs is sufficiently close to 1 relative to be), then 
only the earnings stripping rule will affect the multinational's choices.  And, if the 
safe harbor rule is strict enough (bs is sufficiently close to zero given be), then 
only the safe harbor rule will affect the multinational's choices.   
 However, Figure 1 does not account for the multinational's overall capital 
and labor choices nor the general equilibrium effects of choosing bs and be 
through the wage rate.  For example, consider an increase in be when both 
constraints bind (as at point b).  Holding K fixed, a relaxation of the earnings 
stripping rule implies a higher transfer price.  If this change in be also increases K 
(as we will show it does) then the safe harbor constraint is indirectly relaxed, and 
this would imply a lower transfer price.  Thus, the general equilibrium 
implications of safe harbor and earnings stripping rules can differ from their 
partial equilibrium properties.  To capture these effects, we need to characterize 
equilibrium behavior.  
 
4. Host Country Equilibria. 
 A host country equilibrium consists of profit-maximizing multinational 
choices, defined by (3.3) and the associated complementary slackness conditions, 
profit-maximizing employment by domestic firms, defined by   
 
   ( )L dG L w ,        (4.1) 
 
and a wage rate that clears the host labor market, 
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   1m dL L  .       (4.2) 
 
GSS point out that, with a constant returns to scale multinational production 
function, an equilibrium with positive FDI may not exist.  For now, we will 
assume that, for each value of bs and be, a positive-FDI equilibrium will exist.     
 Denote the equilibrium that arises when no thin-capitalization rule is in 
force by K*, B*, * * *, ,m dL L , and w*. Then define * *ˆ ( ) /sb B K and 
* * * * * *ˆ ( ) / ( ( , ) )e m mb B F K L w L   .  A safe harbor constraint with s sb b will 
never bind, nor will an earnings stripping constraint with e eb b .       
 
4.1 Safe Harbor Only. 
 Suppose bs and be are set so that, in equilibrium, only the safe harbor rule 
binds.  The detailed analysis of this case, as well as the other cases, can be found 
in the appendix.   In order for an equilibrium to exist in which only the safe harbor 
constraint binds, (A.1) implies that 
 
   * *( ( )) / (1 )s e K e sb b F b r b c c t       .   (4.3)   
  
Proposition 3. An equilibrium exists in which only the safe harbor rule binds if, 
and only if, s sb b  and * */ ((1 ) ( ))s e eb rb t b c c      . 
 
The first inequality ensures that the unconstrained optimal level of internal debt is 
not feasible.  The second inequality shows that an equilibrium exists in which 
only the safe harbor rule binds if bs is sufficiently small.  The second inequality is 
satisfied by some, but not all values of bs and be because * r  and 
* * *( ) ( )c r c r       (due to the convexity of c) imply that the right-hand side 
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of the inequality is strictly less than 1.15  Intuitively, the existence of this upper 
bound occurs because an increase in bs causes the multinational to employ more 
capital (and labor) and the net effect is to decrease the equilibrium return to 
capital.  As the equilibrium return to capital falls, the right-hand side of (4.3) gets 
smaller so any slack in the earnings stripping constraint is reduced.   
 The boundary of this safe-harbor equilibrium region is defined by 
* *(1 ) ( ( ))s e st b b r b c c      .  Totally differentiating this equation with respect 
to bs and be implies that / 0s edb db   and 2 2/ 0s ed b db  .  Thus, higher values of 
be increase the range of values of bs such that equilibria exist in which only the 
safe harbor constraint binds.    
 The comparative statics analysis with respect to bs also shows that a 
relaxation of the safe harbor rule, due to an increase in bs, causes the equilibrium 
levels of K, Lm, and w to increase, Ld to decrease, and * to remain unchanged 
(see the appendix).   
 
4.2 Earnings Stripping Only. 
 Now suppose that bs and be are set so that only the earnings stripping 
constraint binds in equilibrium.  Define ES to be the equilibrium transfer price 
when only an earnings stripping rule is imposed. The appendix shows in 
equilibrium (see (A.7)) that 
 
  (1 / )ESe e Kt tb b c F r    .      (4.4) 
 
In order for only the earnings stripping constraint to bind, (4.4) implies that  
                                                 
15 The convexity of ( )c r  implies that *c c rc rt      at *  .  Then 
* *(1 ) ( ) (1 )e e et b c c r t b t rb          for all t ≥ 0.   
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  / (1 / )ES ESs e e eb rb t tb b c     .     (4.5) 
 
Proposition 4. An equilibrium exists in which only the earnings stripping 
constraint binds if, and only if, e eb b  and / ( (1 ) )ESs e e eb rb t tb b c    . 
 
Proposition 4 shows that an equilibrium exists in which only the earnings 
stripping constraint binds only if bs is sufficiently large.  The second inequality is 
necessary and not sufficient.  If the marginal debt-financing costs increase quickly 
enough, no earnings stripping equilibrium may exist because the multinational's 
unconstrained profit-maximizing amount of internal debt may be feasible.  This 
possibility is ruled out by the first inequality.   
  Unlike the safe harbor case, the effect of be on the equilibrium value of K 
now depends on the debt-financing costs.  However, if the marginal debt-
financing costs are sufficiently small for all / sB K b (which is an upper bound 
on the debt to equity ratio in this case), then K will be increasing in be. 
 
4.3 Safe Harbor and Earnings Stripping.   
 Finally, suppose that bs and be are set so that both constraints bind in 
equilibrium.  Combining the results from Propositions 3 and 4 gives us the 
conditions under which an equilibrium can exist with both constraints binding. 
 
Proposition 5. An equilibrium exists in which both the safe harbor and earnings 
stripping constraint bind only if 
 * */ ( (1 ) ( )) / ( (1 ) )ESe e s e e erb t b c c b rb t tb b c          . 
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 Since *ES  and ( )t c r   is strictly increasing in  for all *  , 
the inequalities in Proposition 5 define a non-empty interval.  The comparative 
statics analysis in the appendix shows that both an increase in bs and an increase 
in be increase K, Lm, and w. An increase in bs reduces the equilibrium value of 
as the multinational now has an incentive to increase its debt financing while 
reducing its use of its transfer price to shift income out of the host country.  In 
contrast, an increase in be results in a larger transfer price. 
 
5. Host Country Welfare. 
 We restrict attention to national income maximization.  It is affected by 
FDI in three ways: tax revenues from the FDI, increased wages, and lower profits 
for domestic entrepreneurs.  Given the definition of national income, Y, in (2.6), a 
safe harbor rule implies that  
 
  *( )SH K sY w t F b K           (5.1) 
 
while an earnings stripping rule or a combined safe harbor/earnings stripping rule 
implies that 
 
  (1 )ES e KY w t b F K    .      (5.2) 
 
 Totally differentiating YSH and using the fact that 1d mL L   in any 
equilibrium with positive FDI yields 
 
 * *( )SH m KL m K s KK sdY L dw tF KdL t F b F K dK tKdb       .  (5.3) 
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As shown in the appendix, the constant returns to scale properties of F combined 
with the labor market conditions, FL = w = GL and Ld + Lm =1, imply that 
/ ( )m KL LL LLdL F dK F G    and / ( )LL KL LL LLdw G F dK F G  .  Thus, one can 
write dYSH as 
 
 * *[ ( ) (1 ) / ( )]SH K s KK LL LL LL sdY t F b t F G K F G dK tKdb          (5.4) 
 
where the coefficient on dK is strictly positive because * s Kb F  in all 
equilibrium for which the earnings stripping constraint is slack.  If K is 
sufficiently large at bs = 0, the national income maximizing safe harbor limit can 
be zero.16 
 Totally differentiating YES and using the labor market conditions again 
implies that  
 
    [ (1 ) (1 (1 )) / ( )]ES e K e KK LL LL LL K edY t b F t b F G K F G dK tF Kdb       .  (5.5) 
 
The coefficient on dK is unambiguously positive.  Also, notice that (5.5) does not 
have a dbs term even though bs does affect the equilibrium transfer price when the 
host country adopts both a safe harbor rule and an earnings stripping rule.  When 
both constraints bind, * s e Kb b F  , so the effect of bs on * is reflected in 
equilibrium changes in FK.   
 Since a change in bs has no direct effect on national income when both 
constraints bind in equilibrium and section 4.3 shows that dK/dbs > 0, (5.5) 
                                                 
16 GSS show that the optimal host country safe harbor rule may support no FDI in 
equilibrium.  In such a case, the minimum value of bs above which FDI is strictly 
positive will itself be strictly positive.   
24 
 
implies that it is never optimal for the host country to set its safe harbor limit so 
low that this case arises in equilibrium. Relaxing the safe harbor rule will increase 
FDI and thus wages and production without any loss in tax revenue since the 
earnings stripping rule is still binding. 
 
Proposition 6. The optimal values of bs and be never generate an equilibrium in 
which both constraints bind. 
 
 Proposition 6 calls into question the thin-capitalization policies of 
Denmark and Japan.  Our model predicts that these countries would be better off 
just imposing an earnings stripping rule.   
 We now address the question of the optimal host country thin-
capitalization policy when one allows the host country to use either a single rule 
or a combination of rules.  The host country's tradeoffs are illustrated in Figure 2.  
The area shaded with dots corresponds to the values of bs and be for which neither 
constraint will bind in equilibrium. The region to the left of the red line consists of 
the values for which only the safe harbor rule will bind in equilibrium and the 
region to the right of the thick black line consists of the values for which only the 
earnings stripping constraint will bind in equilibrium.  The region between the red 
and black lines consists of the values for which both constraints will bind in 
equilibrium.  *sb  and 
*
eb  represent the optimal safe harbor and earnings stripping 
limits when only that rule is in effect.17  The dashed lines represent portions of 
iso-welfare curves.  In the safe-harbor-only region, the iso-welfare curves are 
vertical since decreases in be within this region have no effect on national income.  
                                                 
17 If the optimal single-rule policy induces zero FDI in equilibrium, there will be a 
range of limit values that are optimal.  In this case, *sb or 
*
eb represent the 
maximum value consistent with zero FDI. 
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Similarly, in the earnings-stripping-only region, the iso-welfare curves are 
horizontal since increases in bs within this region have no effect on national 
income.  
    
These properties of the iso-welfare curves and Proposition 6 lead to the main 
result of our paper. 
 
Theorem 1. If *sb or 
*
eb is strictly positive, the optimal thin-capitalization policy for 
a host country is an earnings stripping rule without a safe harbor rule.  
 
Figure 2 shows why Theorem 1 arises.  The policy *( , ) ( ,1)s e sb b b  is the optimal 
policy when only a safe harbor rule is in effect.  National income at *( ,1)sb is the 
 
 
SH only 
SH+ES 
No Thin Cap 
1 
be 
bs 
1 
ES only 
•
•
Figure 2: Binding equilibrium thin capitalization rules. 
x •
y
•
z
•
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same as at policy x.  As long as the optimal stand-alone safe harbor limit is 
strictly positive, national income at policy y is strictly greater than at policy x 
since dY/dbs > 0 in the region where both the safe harbor and earnings stripping 
constraints bind in equilibrium. (If * 0sb  , this region is empty.)   National 
income is the same at policies y and z.  Finally, national income is greater at 
policy *(1, )eb than at policy z since policy
*(1, )eb is the optimal policy when only an 
earnings stripping rule is in effect. If * 0sb  , the optimality of a stand-alone 
earnings stripping rule continues to hold if * 0eb  .  If both stand-alone limits are 
zero, then the host country is indifferent to either stand-alone rule. 
 The reason for this result is that internal debt (i.e., debt shifting) allows the 
firm to avoid the tax on the normal rate of return on mobile capital directly, 
whereas an abusive transfer price is an indirect and more costly way of mitigating 
the tax wedge both for the firm and society.  An earnings stripping rule is more 
effective at curbing abusive transfer pricing and is therefore a better choice from 
the host country’s perspective. 
 
6. Extensions. 
 We now weaken several of the model's assumptions to demonstrate the 
robustness of Theorem 1. 
 
6.1 Generalized Welfare Function. 
 The national income welfare function weights domestic firm after-tax 
profits the same as worker income.  More generally, one could define host 
country welfare under binding safe harbor and earnings stripping rules as 
 
  (1 ) (1 )ES e KY w t t b F K t            (6.1) 
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where [0,1]   is the welfare weight on the after-tax income of the domestic 
entrepreneurs.  Now the modified version of (5.5) implies that  
 
  (1 )[ (1 ) (1 (1 )(1 ) (1 )) ]
ES
m KK LL
e K e
s m LL LL s
dY L F G K dKt b F t t b
db L F G db
          .  (6.2)   
 
As the coefficient on dK/dbs is strictly positive for all β, lowering the welfare 
weight on domestic entrepreneur income does not alter Theorem 1. 
 Another possibility would be to include multinational profit in the host 
welfare function.  This would be appropriate if host citizens owned stocks in the 
multinational.  Let 1   denote the welfare weight on Π such that 1    .  
This change would add the term Π / sd db   to (6.2).  However, since an increase 
in bs relaxes the safe harbor constraint, dΠ/dbs > 0 when both constraints bind and 
national welfare is still strictly increasing in bs in this region and Theorem 1 still 
holds. 
 
6.2 The multinational production function and debt-financing costs. 
 In this subsection, we relax the assumptions that the multinational's 
production function exhibits constant returns to scale and the debt-financing 
function depends only on the firm's debt-equity ratio.  We now assume that 
( , )mF L K  is strictly increasing and strictly concave in Lm and K and that the debt-
financing costs, ( , )D B K , can depend on more than B/K.   We now assume that  
DB > 0, DK < 0, DBB > 0, DKK > 0, and DBK < 0.  The change to F implies that we 
can no longer write the equilibrium value of the subsidiary's pre-tax income as 
KF K as in (4.3).  In an equilibrium in which both constraints bind, it will now be 
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the case that s e Kb b F  , which means that the multinational is able to shift some 
economic rents out of the host country prior to taxation.  The presence of these 
rents creates an incentive for the multinational to increase its transfer price, and 
reduce K in the presence of the earnings stripping rule, and thus can affect the 
sign of dK/dbs.  The more general cost-financing function can also affect the sign 
of dK/dbs through the term BK s BBKD b KD , which is a measure of the convexity 
of the marginal debt-financing costs when sB b K .  As long as the economic 
rents are not too large and the firm's marginal debt-financing costs are not too 
convex, dK/dbs will remain positive and Theorem 1 will still hold.     
 
7. Conclusion. 
 Thin-capitalization rules are an important instrument for protecting a host 
country's corporate tax base, especially in view of the debate on corporate 
inversions and base erosion by multinationals. In 2013, 57 countries had such 
rules in place and most of them used safe harbor rules. Recently, some countries 
have introduced earnings stripping rules. Four countries used earnings stripping 
rules only in 2013. Norway and Finland followed suit in 2014. Five countries 
apply a combination of safe harbor and earnings stripping rules. 
 In this paper, we characterize the set of equilibria for all possible 
combinations of safe harbor and earnings stripping rules in a general-equilibrium 
model with both capital and labor choices. Our model allows multinationals to 
shift income via internal debt financing and transfer pricing. We show that the 
optimal policy that maximizes the host country's national income is a pure 
earnings stripping rule without a safe harbor rule. 
 Our finding follows from the insight that internal debt allows the firm to 
avoid the tax on the normal rate of return on mobile capital directly, whereas an 
abusive transfer price is an indirect and more costly way of mitigating the tax 
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wedge both for the firm and society.  If there are decreasing returns to scale, 
transfer pricing also lets the multinational shift economic profit, which is not 
desirable from an optimal tax policy point of view. An earnings stripping rule is 
more effective at curbing abusive transfer pricing and is therefore a better choice 
from a host country’s perspective.  
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Appendix 
Proposition 1. A profit-maximizing multinational operating under a binding 
earnings stripping rule will choose a transfer price strictly between r and * . 
Proof of Proposition 1.  The situation in which the host country adopts only an 
earnings stripping rule corresponds to setting bs = 1.  With 0D   , the constraint 
B ≤ K cannot bind so ζ = 0.  Thus, to the necessary first-order conditions listed in 
(3.3), we need only add the complementary slackness condition:   
(e) 0and ( ( ) 0mB b F wL      .  If the earnings stripping rule is binding, 
then 0  and *  .  0  also implies via (3.3.b) that t c   .  
Substituting this value of into (3.3.a) then implies that / 0c c D K     .  At 
r  , this condition is violated because 0c c   .  Thus, by the convexity of c, 
r  .          Q.E.D. 
 
Comparative statics when only a safe harbor constraint binds in equilibrium. 
For all equilibria in which only the safe harbor constraint binds, 0  .  Eq. 
(3.3.a) allows us to solve for and substitute the expression into (3.3.d), which 
yields at sB b K ,  
  (1 ) ( )K st F r b c c     .      (A.1)  
The debt-financing costs do not influence the equilibrium return on capital 
because, since ( )D  depends only on B/K, the increased marginal cost of debt 
financing from increasing B is exactly offset by the decreased marginal cost of 
debt financing from increasing K.  Eq. (3.3.b) implies that the equilibrium transfer 
price is * , which is independent of bs.  Differentiating the labor market 
conditions,(3.3.c), (4.1), and (4.2), with respect to bs then yields 
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0LL m KLF dL F dK dw   , 0LL dG dL dw  , and d mdL dL  .  Together these 
equations imply that / ( )m KL LL LLdL F dK F G    and 
  / ( )KL m KK KK LL LL LLF dL F dK F G dK F G   .    (A.2) 
Then, totally differentiating (A.1) with respect to bs yields 
  (1 ) / ( ) ( )KK LL LL LL st F G dK F G c c db         (A.3) 
or that / 0sdK db  . 
 
Comparative statics when only the earnings stripping constraint binds in 
equilibrium.     
For all equilibria in which only the earnings stripping constraint binds, 0  .  
Eqs. (3.3.a) and (3.3.b) imply that  
  ( / ) /c c D B K K    .      (A.4) 
The labor market conditions imply the same relationships between dK, dLm, dLd, 
and dw as in the safe-harbor-only analysis.  With only the earnings stripping 
constraint binding, e KB b F K  , so that (A.4) becomes 
  ( / ) /e Kc c D b F K          (A.5) 
and (3.3.d) can be written as 
  (1 / )e e Kt tb b c F r    .      (A.6) 
Totally differentiating (A.5) and (A.6), evaluated at ES  , with respect to be 
then yields 
 22 ( / ( ))( )
e KK LL K
e K e
LL LL
D b F G D F DdK c b F D K d db
K K F G K
   
         
 (A.7) 
and 
2(1 ( ) / ) ( ) / ( ) /
( )
KK LL
e e K K e
LL LL
F Gt b t c dK b F c c d F t c db
F G
              .   
           (A.8) 
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We can solve (A.7) and (A.8) for dK/dbe.  The numerator of dK/dbe is equal to 
  
2
3
( ) ( )K e K
F b D t c c t c F
K
  
    .     (A.9) 
From (3.3.a) and (A.5), /t c D K c c      so t c   and (A.9) is strictly 
positive.  The denominator of dK/dbe is equal to 
  
2
2 2
2
( )
(1 / )
e KK LL e K
LL LL
e K KK LL
e e
LL LL
D D b F G b F c c
K K F G
b D F F Gc t b t b c
K F G
 
 
               
             
.  (A.10) 
The sign of the denominator can be positive or negative as the first and third 
bracketed terms in (A.10) are positive and the second and fourth terms are 
negative.  However, if 0D  , then dK/dbe  > 0.  Thus, as long as D and D  are 
sufficiently small for all / sB K b , then dK/dbe will continue to be positive.  
 
Comparative statics when both the safe harbor constraint and the earnings 
stripping constraint bind in equilibrium. 
Eqs. (3.3.a) and (3.3.b) imply that ( ) /sc c D b K      .  Thus, similar to 
equilibria in which only the safe harbor constraint binds,  
  (1 ( )) ( )e K st b t c F r b c c            (A.11) 
although now need not equal * . The labor market conditions imply the same 
relationships between dK, dLm, dLd, and dw as in the safe-harbor-only analysis.  
Now totally differentiating (A.11) with respect to be yields 
(1 ( )) / ( ) ( ) ( )e KK LL LL LL s e K K et b t c F G dK F G c b b F d t c F db            .(A.12) 
Because both constraints bind, s e Kb b F  so the d term is equal to zero and
/ 0edK db  .  Totally differentiating (A.11) with respect to bs yields 
(1 ( )) / ( ) ( ) ( )e KK LL LL LL s e K st b t c F G dK F G c b b F d c c db             .(A.13) 
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The d term is again equal to zero and / 0sdK db  .  Finally, totally 
differentiating s e Kb b F  yields 
   / ( )s s K e e KK LL LL LLb d db F db b F G dK F G     .   (A.14) 
Eq. (A.14) implies that / 0sd db   as relaxing the safe harbor limit leads the 
multinational to substitute towards more debt financing and away from transfer 
pricing.  Eq. (A.14) also implies that  
    / ( / ) / (F )s e K e KK LL e LL LLb d db F b F G dK db G     .  (A.15) 
Substituting (A.12) into (A.15) then implies that 
  / (1 ) / (1 ( )) 0s e K eb d db t F t b t c         .  
  
 
